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Fair Questions: A Call and Proposal 
for Using General Verdicts with 
Special Interrogatories to Prevent 
Biased and Unjust Convictions 
Charles Eric Hintz* 
Bias and other forms of logical corner-cutting are an unfortunate aspect 
of criminal jury deliberations. However, the preferred verdict system in the 
federal courts, the general verdict, does nothing to counter that. Rather, by 
forcing jurors into a simple binary choice — guilty or not guilty — the 
general verdict facilitates and encourages such flawed reasoning. Yet the 
federal courts continue to stick to the general verdict, ironically out of a 
concern that deviating from it will harm defendants by leading juries to 
convict. 
This Essay calls for a change: expand the use of a special findings verdict, 
the general verdict with special interrogatories, to every case in order to 
guard against prejudicial reasoning and like shortcuts. Moreover, to ensure 
that such a change is feasible and does not run afoul of the concerns that 
bind courts to the general verdict, it suggests that courts require jurors to 
answer special interrogatories when, but only when, they have proceeded 
down the path towards finding the defendant guilty, using a verdict 
procedure designed to retain the benefits of general verdicts while 
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jettisoning their flawed elements and complying with current practice. That 
change hopefully could vastly improve our jury system and allow the jury 
to truly serve — in the words of the Supreme Court — as “a criminal 
defendant’s fundamental ‘protection of life and liberty against race or color 
prejudice.’” 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court recently called upon “our Nation to rise above 
racial classifications that are so inconsistent with our commitment to 
the equal dignity of all persons” and emphasized the “imperative to 
purge racial prejudice from the administration of justice.”1 That call is 
undoubtedly necessary and of paramount importance, as 2020’s tragic 
assaults on members of the Black community by police — and the 
protests associated with them — have yet again made plain.  
The need to eliminate racial bias in our criminal justice system, 
however, is far from limited to law enforcement. Indeed, the Court 
voiced its call to action in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, a case involving 
bias in a criminal jury.2 There, it expressed that the jury is supposed to 
serve as “a criminal defendant’s fundamental ‘protection of life and 
liberty against race or color prejudice.’”3 But it cautioned that 
“[p]ermitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages ‘both the fact 
and the perception’ of the jury’s role as ‘a vital check against the 
wrongful exercise of power by the State.’”4 
Unfortunately, however, jurors are often inclined to rely on bias and 
other defective reasoning. One would think, therefore, that our verdict 
procedures would be designed to counter that. Yet they are not. The 
prevailing verdict form used in the federal courts, the general verdict, 
amplifies prejudices and gives such cognitive fallacies free reign to 
infect outcomes by distilling the entire decision-making process into a 
simple binary choice — guilty or not guilty — rather than focusing 
juries on the issues that matter. Moreover, when a flawed decision 
occurs, the general verdict shields that decision from review by 
revealing no information about the jury’s thinking. 
The solution should be straightforward: require juries to answer 
questions about the key issues in the case and their reasoning. That 
approach would clarify, and force juries to concentrate on, the specific 
points necessary to support a conviction — thereby reducing the ability 
of extra-legal considerations to influence the outcome — and reveal the 
jury’s decisional grounds for later review. Nevertheless, courts are 
averse to such a solution, due — oddly enough — to a concern that 
non-general verdicts would harm defendants. Thus, general verdicts 
remain the norm, despite their serious flaws and likelihood of 
producing biased and unjust decisions. 
 
 1 Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017). 
 2 See id. 
 3 Id. at 868 (citation omitted). 
 4 Id. (citations omitted). 
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The question, then, is how to create a verdict system that minimizes 
bias and error while avoiding out-of-hand rejection by the courts. This 
Essay proposes an answer: in every case, require juries to respond to 
special interrogatories — in addition to rendering a general 
verdict — when, but only when, they are proceeding towards a finding 
of guilt, following a verdict procedure designed to avoid the problems 
courts fear and comply with present practice.5 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the types of verdicts 
used in the federal system and explains why general verdicts are the 
norm in criminal cases. Part II explores the problems created and 
amplified by general verdicts. And Part III describes my proposed 
solution and engages with counterarguments.6 
I. CRIMINAL VERDICTS 
The federal courts generally employ three types of verdicts: (1) the 
general verdict; (2) the special verdict; and (3) the general verdict with 
special interrogatories (the latter two I term “special findings 
verdicts”).7 The first simply requires the jury to “find[] in favor of one 
party or the other, as opposed to resolving specific fact 
questions”8 — guilty or not guilty, in criminal cases. The second 
demands that “the jury make[] findings only on factual issues submitted 
 
 5 I am not the first to propose the use of non-general verdicts for certain types of 
criminal cases or purposes. See, e.g., Meghan A. Ferguson, Note, Balancing Lenity, 
Rationality, and Finality: A Case for Special Verdict Forms in Cases Involving Overlapping 
Federal Criminal Offenses, 59 DUKE L.J. 1195, 1197-98, 1215 (2010); Kyle B. Grigel, 
Note, Credibility Interrogatories in Criminal Trials, 71 STAN. L. REV. 461, 466 (2019). 
Additionally, commentators have argued that interrogatories, when employed, should 
only be used “after a jury has voted to convict.” Eric S. Miller, Compound-Complex 
Criminal Statutes and the Constitution: Demanding Unanimity as to Predicate Acts, 104 
YALE L.J. 2277, 2305-07 (1995); accord Grigel, supra, at 488. Some also suggest that jury 
reasoning should be consistently revealed in some manner. See Alice Curci, Note, 
Twelve Angrier Men: Enforcing Verdict Accountability in Criminal Jury Trials, 59 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 217, 240-41 (2019). Previous scholarship has not, however, called for 
special interrogatories in every case and across contexts, and this Essay’s proposed 
verdict procedure is uniquely designed to honor prevailing concerns and practices. 
 6 Although much of this Essay is applicable to state criminal justice systems, the 
focus here is on the federal system. A narrower scope is more conducive to designing a 
verdict procedure that complies with existing law and practice and is more appropriate 
for the shorter essay format. Further, given that states often draw on federal practices, 
a federally focused proposal may have broad impact. 
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 841 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2016); Frank C. 
Pollara Grp. v. Ocean View Inv. Holding, LLC, 784 F.3d 177, 190 (3d Cir. 2015); Zhang 
v. Am. Gen. Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 8 Verdict, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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to them by the judge, who then decides the legal effect of the verdict.”9 
The third merges the previous two, requiring jurors to return “[a] 
general verdict accompanied by answers to written interrogatories on 
one or more issues of fact that bear on the verdict.”10 
Despite that range of options, general verdicts are the norm in 
criminal cases.11 And that is so because courts view the alternatives as 
harmful to defendants.12 Courts commonly observe, for example, that 
any alternative verdict might improperly pressure the jury to convict.13 
As an oft-cited First Circuit decision, United States v. Spock, cautioned: 
There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict of 
guilty than to approach it step by step. A juror, wishing to 
acquit, may be formally catechized. By a progression of 
questions each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable 
to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a 
conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted. The 
result may be accomplished by a majority of the jury, but the 
course has been initiated by the judge, and directed by him 
through the frame of the questions.14 
That line of reasoning, moreover, is usually tied to the jury’s power 
to acquit based on circumstances other than the letter of the 
law — whether called common sense, lenity, or nullification.15 Spock, 
for instance, emphasized that general verdicts are desirable because of 
“the principle that the jury, as the conscience of the community, must 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id.; see also Frank C. Pollara Grp., 784 F.3d at 190. 
 11 See, e.g., 3 PETER J. HENNING & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 512 (4th ed. 2010). 
 12 See, e.g., Curci, supra note 5, at 236. 
 13 See, e.g., United States v. Hedgepeth, 434 F.3d 609, 613 (3d Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998). Courts sometimes frame this 
rationale as a desire to preserve jury independence, but the core motivation is protecting 
defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 766 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he rule against special verdicts . . . . seemingly exists to protect the rights of the 
defendant.”); Reed, 147 F.3d at 1180 (“Although there is no per se prohibition, ‘[a]s a 
rule, special verdicts in criminal trials are not favored.’ This rule is fashioned to protect 
the rights of criminal defendants by preventing the court from pressuring the jury to 
convict.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). But see Grigel, supra note 5, at 490 
(suggesting that courts are concerned about “pierc[ing] the veil of jury deliberation”). 
 14 United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969). 
 15 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 841 F.3d 339, 346-47 (5th Cir. 2016); 
Blackwell, 459 F.3d at 766; United States v. Stonefish, 402 F.3d 691, 697-98 (6th Cir. 
2005); Reed, 147 F.3d at 1180; United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416-18 (3d 
Cir. 1982); Grigel, supra note 5, at 503. 
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be permitted to look at more than logic” in deciding whether to acquit 
and that “[i]f it were otherwise there would be no more reason why a 
verdict should not be directed against a defendant in a criminal case 
than in a civil one.”16 And as the Fifth Circuit explained more recently: 
Even with respect to “[s]pecial interrogatories,” we have 
repeated the refrain that they “should not be used in criminal 
trials.” Much of that hostility stems from a desire not to 
undermine jury nullification . . . . Although a controversial 
power that courts purportedly do not encourage, “the jury’s 
power of lenity explains why the use of special interrogatories, 
which might ‘catechize a jury as to its reasons,’ has been met 
with a lack of judicial enthusiasm.” A general verdict requiring 
only an answer of “guilty” or “not guilty” permits a jury to reach 
its decision “based more on external circumstances than the 
strict letter of the law.”17 
Finally, courts express a fear that non-general verdicts could harm 
defendants because they might “be more productive of confusion than 
of clarity.”18 For example, in United States v. Wilson,19 the case most 
decisions rely on to support that proposition,20 the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that special interrogatories had confused the jury into 
impermissibly shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant.21  
In sum, although there are several types of verdicts, federal courts 
favor general verdicts in criminal cases, and they do so out of a desire 
to protect defendants from conviction.22 
 
 16 Spock, 416 F.2d at 182. 
 17 Gonzales, 841 F.3d at 346-47 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 18 Blackwell, 459 F.3d at 766 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 629 F.2d 439, 444 
(6th Cir. 1980)); accord, e.g., Stonefish, 402 F.3d at 697; United States v. Williams, 902 
F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 1990).  
 19 United States v. Wilson, 629 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 20 See, e.g., Blackwell, 459 F.3d at 766; Stonefish, 402 F.3d at 697; Williams, 902 
F.2d at 678. 
 21 See Wilson, 629 F.2d at 444. 
 22 The Supreme Court has also noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
authorize non-general verdicts, whereas the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
contain no such authorizing provision. See Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465, 472 
(2010). However, it has made clear that that distinction just “counsels caution,” is “not 
dispositive,” and does not mean that non-general verdicts “are never appropriate.” Id. 
at 472 & n.11. Moreover, the Court has directly tied its cautious approach to special 
findings verdicts to the defendant-protective reasoning highlighted above. See id. 
(clarifying that “[b]y calling for caution, we do not mean to suggest that special verdicts 
in criminal cases are never appropriate,” and supporting that point with a case quotation 
stating that “[a] District Court should have the discretion to use a jury interrogatory in 
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II. THE PROBLEMS OF GENERAL VERDICTS 
Unfortunately, however, there is a disconnect between the federal 
courts’ motives and their preference for general verdicts. That is because 
general verdicts enable improper forms of reasoning — including 
prejudice — and then shield the flawed decisions they produce from 
review. 
It is well established that jurors — like people in many 
contexts — take shortcuts in their reasoning,23 frequently employing 
“scripts, schemas, stereotypes, and other cognitive mechanisms” that 
can run counter to rational consideration of the law and evidence.24 
Importantly, jurors are highly likely to be swayed by factors, such as 
race, that should be irrelevant.25 So for instance, studies have suggested 
 
cases where risk of prejudice to the defendant is slight and the advantage of securing 
particularized fact-finding is substantial” (citation omitted)). Thus, the Federal Rules 
rationale does little, if any, independent work and is functionally encompassed by the 
defendant-protective rationale. 
 23 See, e.g., Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying 
& Jennifer Price, Jury Decision Making, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 672, 699-700 
(2001); James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 278-79 
(2018); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion 
Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 298-99, 335 (2012); Christopher T. Stein & Michelle 
Drouin, Cognitive Bias in the Courtroom: Combating the Anchoring Effect Through Tactical 
Debiasing, 52 U.S.F. L. REV. 393, 394 (2018); Mikah K. Thompson, Bias on Trial: Toward 
an Open Discussion of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243, 
1246-75, 1249 n.37; Richard C. Waites & David A. Giles, Are Jurors Equipped to Decide 
the Outcome of Complex Cases?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 19, 37-39 (2005). 
 24 Devine et al., supra note 23, at 699; accord, e.g., Jeffrey H. Kahn & John E. 
Lopatka, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Reducing Confusion or Creating Bias?, 108 KY. L.J. 239, 266-
67 (2019–20); Lora M. Levett & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing 
Expert Witnesses for Educating Jurors About Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 363, 365 (2008); Monica K. Miller, Joseph Dimitrov, Brian H. Bornstein & 
Ashley Zarker-Sorensen, Bibles in the Jury Room: Psychological Theories Question Judicial 
Assumptions, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 579, 599-601 (2013). 
 25 See, e.g., Devine et al., supra note 23, at 673-74, 678, 683; Francis X. Flanagan, 
Race, Gender, and Juries: Evidence from North Carolina, 61 J.L. & ECON. 189, 192 (2018); 
Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The 
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 189-90, 207 
(2010); Richardson & Goff, supra note 23, at 301, 326, 335; Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 282 (2007); Natalie Salmanowitz, Unconventional 
Methods for a Traditional Setting: The Use of Virtual Reality to Reduce Implicit Bias in the 
Courtroom, 15 U.N.H. L. REV. 117, 126-28 (2016); Christian B. Sundquist, Uncovering 
Juror Racial Bias, 96 DENV. L. REV. 309, 345-46 (2019); Thompson, supra note 23, at 
1246-75, 1249 n.37; Ashok Chandran, Note, Color in the “Black Box”: Addressing Racism 
in Juror Deliberations, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 28, 47-48 (2014); Samantha Saddler, Note, 
A Defendant’s Race as a Determinant of the Outcome of His Lawsuit, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1771, 1782-84. 
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that jurors treat demographically similar defendants differently than 
demographically distinct ones.26 Likewise, studies have noted that 
“juries composed of more black men are more likely to acquit any 
defendant, especially black defendants, and juries composed of more 
white men are more likely to convict black defendants.”27 Furthermore, 
juries may associate “Blackness” with “guilt” or “criminality.”28 And 
some scholars have observed that Black defendants may be treated 
especially harshly “if the victim is white.”29 Finally, research has shown 
that white jurors may be more likely to convict a Black defendant when 
the issue of race is not presented, but less likely to do so when it is.30 
It turns out, moreover, that juries seem more inclined to resort to 
shortcut thinking — such as bias — when they are confused or mired 
in complexity.31 And they frequently are.32 For example, jury 
instructions can be lengthy, opaque, and legalistic, and jurors are 
commonly baffled or puzzled by them.33 As a 1948 Second Circuit 
decision, Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., put it well:  
 
 26 See, e.g., Devine et al., supra note 23, at 673-74; Chandran, supra note 25, at 47-48. 
 27 Flanagan, supra note 25, at 192; see also Saddler, supra note 25, at 1782 (“[T]here 
is also evidence that all-white juries convict black defendants ‘significantly more often’ 
than white defendants.” (citation omitted)). 
 28 See, e.g., Levinson et al., supra note 25, at 190, 207; Sundquist, supra note 25, at 
345-46; see also Richardson & Goff, supra note 23, at 303-04 (describing general studies 
reflecting this association). 
 29 Roberts, supra note 25, at 282; accord, e.g., Devine et al., supra note 23, at 683; 
Chandran, supra note 25, at 48. 
 30 See, e.g., Salmanowitz, supra note 25, at 128, 132; Saddler, supra note 25, at 1783. 
 31 See, e.g., Devine et al., supra note 23, at 699-700; Dillon, supra note 23, at 266-
67, 278-79; Valerie P. Hans & Juliet Dee, Whiplash: Who’s to Blame?, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
1093, 1113 (2003); Kahn & Lopatka, supra note 24, 266-67; Levett & Kovera, supra 
note 24, at 365; Stein & Drouin, supra note 23, at 394; Joseph A. Vitriol & Margaret 
Bull Kovera, Exposure to Capital Voir Dire May Not Increase Convictions Despite 
Increasing Pretrial Presumption of Guilt, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 472, 474 (2018); Debra 
L. Worthington, Merrie Jo Stallard, Joseph M. Price & Peter J. Goss, Hindsight Bias, 
Daubert, and the Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 154, 157 
(2002); Eugene Morgulis, Note, Juror Reactions to Scientific Testimony: Unique 
Challenges in Complex Mass Torts, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 252, 254, 266-69, 278 
(2009); see also Richardson & Goff, supra note 23, at 301-14 (observing, outside the 
jury context, that difficult and complex decisions can lead to shortcut forms of thinking, 
such as implicit bias); Waites & Giles, supra note 23, at 38-39, 63 (acknowledging that 
complexity leads to heuristics, but concluding that evidence suggests jurors “are quite 
capable of making well reasoned decisions” in complex cases). 
 32 See Michael G. Heyman, Lost in Translation: Criminal Jury Trials in the United 
States, 3 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-7 (2014). 
 33 See, e.g., John P. Cronan, Is Any of this Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to 
Aid Criminal Juror Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1187, 1196, 1202-11, 1258 
(2002); Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” 
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[O]ften the judge must state th[e] rules to the jury with such 
niceties that many lawyers do not comprehend them, and it is 
impossible that the jury can. . . . “[J]uries have the 
disadvantage . . . of being treated like children while the 
testimony is going on, but then being doused with a kettleful of 
law during the charge that would make a third-year law-student 
blanch.”34 
Likewise, the substance of the case itself may be difficult or 
confounding, particularly where the subject matter, facts, or evidence 
are complex or scientific.35 And of course, all of that is in addition to 
the fact that jurors in every criminal case are called upon to undertake 
the inherently complicated and confusing task of “mak[ing] difficult 
decisions about emotional issues with limited information,” and doing 
so in an “unfamiliar setting.”36 In other words, the legal system forces 
 
in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 
1555-60, 1564-66, 1569-70, 1574-75 (2012); Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, 
Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701, 701-02 (2000); 
Sara Gordon, Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the Application of “Plain-
Language” Jury Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 644-45 (2013); Vida B. Johnson, 
Presumed Fair? Voir Dire on the Fundamentals of Our Criminal Justice System, 45 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 545, 552 (2015); Kahn & Lopatka, supra note 24, at 267; Stein & Drouin, 
supra note 23, at 394; Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex 
Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 49, 51-54 (1997); Molly Armour, Comment, Dazed and 
Confused: The Need for a Legislative Solution to the Constitutional Problem of Juror 
Incomprehension, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. R. L. REV. 641, 652, 655 (2008); Kate H. Nepveu, 
Note, Beyond “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”: Giving Special Verdicts in Criminal Jury Trials, 21 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 265 (2003). 
 34 Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1948) (citation 
omitted). 
 35 See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 23, at 276-79; Valerie P. Hans, David H. Kaye, B. 
Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley & Stephanie Albertson, Science in the Jury Box: Jurors’ 
Comprehension of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 60, 60-61 (2011); 
Levett & Kovera, supra note 24, at 365; James R. Steiner-Dillon, Epistemic 
Exceptionalism, 52 IND. L. REV. 207, 240-41 (2019); Strier, supra note 33, at 54-56; 
Vitriol & Kovera, supra note 31, at 474; Worthington et al., supra note 31, at 157; Meha 
Goyal, Note, An Exception to Trial by Jury in Complex White-Collar Crime Cases, 31 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 621, 621, 624 (2018); Morgulis, supra note 31, at 254, 266-69, 278; 
Karen Butler Reisinger, Note, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A Comparison of Two 
Models, 32 IND. L. REV. 225, 241 (1998). 
 36 Heyman, supra note 32, at 4-5; Stein & Drouin, supra note 23, at 394; see also J. 
Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of 
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 749 (1988); cf. Sarah Thimsen, 
Brian H. Bornstein & Monica K. Miller, The Dynamite Charge: Too Explosive for Its Own 
Good?, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 93, 115 (2009) (“Finally, people often use heuristics in 
situations of uncertainty. Jurors are often in situations of uncertainty; indeed, it is their 
verdict that is intended to provide certainty for the court and society by giving a final 
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jurors to contend with complexity and can render them confused, 
which, in turn, makes them likely to employ problematic shortcuts. 
General verdicts, however, facilitate such reasoning by channeling 
jurors into a simple binary choice: guilty or not guilty. By requiring an 
outcome-focused decision, rather than guiding the jury’s reasoning 
through the issues necessary for a conviction, general verdicts do 
nothing to prevent jurors from jumping to conclusions or to trigger 
more deliberate forms of thinking.37 And by the same token, they do not 
meaningfully restrict the jury to considering only the details or elements 
of the crime charged. Indeed, that is largely their point; general verdicts 
are valued precisely because they permit decisions on extra-legal 
grounds, such as sympathy.38 But that same feature necessarily also 
supports convictions based on bias. Finally, by offering no direction, 
general verdicts fan the flames of whatever complexity or juror 
confusion might exist and therefore amplify the likelihood that jurors 
will rely on prejudices and shortcuts. To quote the Second Circuit again, 
“[t]he general verdict enhances, to the maximum, the power of appeals 
to the biases and prejudices of the jurors” and “confers on the jury a 
vast power to commit error and do mischief by loading it with technical 
burdens far beyond its ability to perform [and] confusing it in 
aggregating instead of segregating the issues.”39 
What is more, general verdicts also shield the poor reasoning they 
facilitate from scrutiny. Most fundamentally, general verdicts reveal 
nothing about the jury’s thinking, rendering any challenge that a jury 
 
judgment about a dispute.”); Vitriol & Kovera, supra note 31, at 474 (“Ambiguous 
situations involving the processing of complex information, such as capital trials, may 
trigger this availability heuristic during social judgments.”). But cf. David S. Rubenstein, 
Immigration Blame, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 150 (2018) (noting that uncertainty “tends 
to trigger deliberative and effortful . . . thinking”). 
 37 Cf., e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 417 (2011) (explaining 
that “[t]he way to block errors” borne of intuitive thinking is to “recognize the signs 
that you are in a cognitive minefield, slow down, and ask for reinforcement from” more 
deliberative mental processes); Richardson & Goff, supra note 23, at 307 (noting that, 
although not a “silver bullet,” “using guidelines, such as ‘stop and think’ or ‘use a 
checklist,’ to safeguard against predictable [heuristic-related] errors does tend to reduce 
those errors, and encouraging introspection also curbs important and predictable 
[heuristic-related] biases”); Elizabeth Thornburg, Cognitive Bias, the “Band of Experts,” 
and the Anti-Litigation Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 791 (2016) (observing that 
“‘checklists’ that force issues to be considered” can “avoid a rush to judgment” (citation 
omitted)). 
 38 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
 39 Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 61 (citation omitted). 
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employed improper reasoning nearly impossible to mount.40 To invoke 
the eloquent articulation of Skidmore a third time, the general verdict 
“shroud[s] in secrecy and mystery the actual results of [the jury’s] 
deliberations,” “covers up all the shortcomings which frail human 
nature is unable to eliminate from the trial of a case,” and “draws the 
curtain upon human errors.”41 
In line with that, the standards governing challenges to general 
verdicts are exceedingly deferential, focusing only on what a 
hypothetical jury could have found, rather than on what the actual jury 
did find. For example, a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a 
general verdict will fail if “after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”42 
Likewise, where multiple theories of liability could support a general 
verdict, the verdict will typically be upheld “as long as there was 
sufficient evidence to support one of the theories presented.”43  
These problems, moreover, can appear in just about any case. 
Cognitive shortcuts and heuristics, while potentially augmented by 
complexity and confusion, are used even in simple decisions. For 
example, “a shopper might have a heuristic to help her find the mustard 
in an unfamiliar grocery store,” such as “mustard is usually in the salad 
dressing aisle.”44 Additionally, case complexity and juror confusion are 
likely quite common — particularly given that the federal criminal law 
has become increasingly complicated over time.45 And general verdicts 
always and inherently preclude meaningful review of jury reasoning.46 
In short, the problems of general verdicts are systemic and widespread. 
In sum, general verdicts are problematic. They encourage biased and 
shortcut reasoning, and they shield that reasoning from scrutiny. Thus, 
although general verdicts may protect defendants in some 
 
 40 See, e.g., Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury’s Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA. L. 
REV. 123, 130 (1985); Ferguson, supra note 5, at 1210. 
 41 Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 61 (citation omitted). 
 42 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
 43 E.g., United States v. Bouchard, 828 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 44 Miller et al., supra note 24, at 599. 
 45 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 841 F.3d 339, 347 (5th Cir. 2016); United 
States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 467 (6th Cir. 2010) (Merritt, J., dissenting); see also 
Nepveu, supra note 33, at 287-88 (explaining that limiting complexity and confusion is 
a reason for non-general verdicts “with potentially wide application” because 
“confusion and complexity are not limited to [cases involving complex-compound 
criminal statutes]”). 
 46 See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances, they are likely to generate unjust convictions in many 
others. We should find a better way. 
III. THE WAY FORWARD 
So what is that better way? The answer, in the abstract, would seem 
to be to require juries, in every case, to answer specific questions about 
the points relevant to a conviction and their thinking (i.e., to use special 
findings verdicts). That would appear to cut against bias or other flawed 
reasoning by guiding jurors through, and demanding particularized 
consideration of, the specific issues necessary for a conviction, rather 
than allowing them to make one judgment about the whole case.47 
Furthermore, by clearly articulating, and directing jurors’ attention to, 
the salient aspects of the case, such a solution could help to resolve 
complexity and confusion, and thereby mitigate any shortcuts or errors 
that could be generated by those issues.48 And it could facilitate verdict 
challenges by revealing impermissible decisional grounds and 
eliminating the need for deferential legal standards.49 
The problem with that solution, of course, is the hesitancy of courts 
to utilize special findings verdicts based on fears that doing so could 
 
 47 See Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir. 1948) (“‘[B]y 
requiring the jury to return the naked facts only we may fairly expect to escape the 
results of sympathy, prejudice and passion.’ That may be too sanguine a hope; but the 
fact verdict may often reduce the more undesirable sway of emotions.” (citation 
omitted)); Avani Mehta Sood, Attempted Justice: Misunderstanding and Bias in 
Psychological Constructions of Criminal Attempt, 71 STAN. L. REV. 593, 660 (2019) (“[T]o 
the extent that the step-by-step structure of special verdicts creates a more guided 
adjudication process, this format might help close entry points for biased 
decisionmaking.”); see also sources cited supra note 37; cf. Harry L. Munsinger & 
Donald R. Philbin, Why Can’t They Settle? The Psychology of Relational Disputes, 18 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 311, 316 (2017) (“By stopping, thinking, and 
applying . . . deliberative analysis to the problem rather than relying on 
unconscious . . . intuitive heuristics, with their inherent biases, the individual is more 
likely to reach a reasoned perspective on the dispute.”).  
 48 See United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 202 (3d Cir. 1980) (“We think special 
interrogatories were properly employed to decrease the likelihood of juror confusion 
and to aid the jury in concentrating on each specific defendant, and the charges against 
him, rather than incriminating one potentially innocent defendant solely on the basis 
of his association with the others.”); Nepveu, supra note 33, at 297 (“In complex or 
confusing cases, special verdicts can help the jury remember the case, keeping any 
number of things — charges, acts, even defendants — straight.”). 
 49 See Gonzales, 841 F.3d at 348 (“Courts consistently vacate convictions when the 
answers to special interrogatories undermine a finding of guilt the jury made on the 
general question.”); Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 65 (“But above all [the special verdict] 
enables the public, the parties and the court to see what the jury has really done.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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harm defendants by pressuring juries to convict, depriving juries of the 
power to acquit on extra-legal grounds, and creating confusion.50 
Nevertheless, it seems possible to expand their use to create a fairer 
justice system. 
Although courts are often hesitant to use special findings verdicts, 
that hesitancy is far from a wholesale bar. Rather, courts permit them 
in certain circumstances, subject to broad discretion.51 For example, 
courts will often allow such verdicts to ensure that juries have reached 
a unanimous decision on each necessary element;52 in complex cases to 
reduce the risk of juror confusion;53 and to address issues other than 
guilt, such as sentencing or criminal forfeiture.54 Moreover, courts are 
far more open to general verdicts with special interrogatories than 
special verdicts, given that, in the words of the Supreme Court, “the 
jury’s constitutional responsibility is not merely to determine the facts, 
but to apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate conclusion of 
guilt or innocence.”55 Finally, they often require special interrogatories 
to be answered after the jury has reached a verdict, in light of many of 
the defendant-protective concerns highlighted above.56  
To synthesize that for our purposes, courts will permit special 
findings verdicts to ensure that the jury has rendered a permissible 
conviction, at least where they do not prevent the jury from making the 
final decision or infringe upon its ability to protect defendants through 
acquittal. Using special findings verdicts to prevent improper 
reasoning — like bias — would therefore seem eminently appropriate, 
at least if the verdict system were designed to avoid the pitfalls of 
deviating from general verdicts and fit the foregoing standards. There 
would also be little reason to decline to employ such a system regularly, 
 
 50 See supra Part I. 
 51 See, e.g., United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 52 See, e.g., United States v. Stegmeier, 701 F.3d 574, 581 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 53 See, e.g., United States v. Edelkind, 467 F.3d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 54 See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 55 E.g., United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 214-15, 214 n.6 (4th Cir. 
2014) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995)). The Supreme 
Court’s language on this point is also geared towards protecting defendants. See United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510-13 (1995) (noting “the historical and 
constitutionally guaranteed right of criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide 
guilt or innocence on every issue,” and explaining that “[t]his right was designed ‘to 
guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,’ and ‘was from 
very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the great bulwark 
of their civil and political liberties’” (citations omitted)); supra note 22.  
 56 See, e.g., United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Hedgepeth, 434 F.3d 609, 613 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 
165, 183 & n.42 (1st Cir. 1969). 
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given the ever-present likelihood of bias, complexity, confusion, and 
flawed reasoning, as well as the fact that such a system should provide 
little cause for judicial concern.57 
Accordingly, I propose this: that in every case, courts use their 
discretion to employ general verdicts with special interrogatories when, 
but only when, the jury has already begun proceeding down the path to 
finding the defendant guilty. And I suggest that courts implement that 
proposal as follows: 
When jurors retire to deliberate, they should receive three verdict 
forms, each in a separate sealed folder. The first verdict form would 
simply ask whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, and a direction 
on the form would tell the jury to open the second folder only if they 
find the defendant guilty.  
To open the second folder, the jurors would be required to sign a 
statement printed on it that they have completed the first verdict form 
and unanimously agree the defendant is guilty. Within that folder 
would be another verdict form, which would contain special 
interrogatories tied to the elements of the offense and designed to 
ensure that the jury found the minimum necessary to convict. A 
direction would also appear on that form, this time saying that the 
jurors: (1) may reconsider the general verdict after answering the 
questions on the second verdict form — and if they do reach a different 
decision, the second verdict form will be shredded; (2) should open the 
third folder if, and only if, the general verdict remains the same; and (3) 
may not reconsider the general verdict after opening the third folder. 
The same process for opening the second folder would then apply to 
the third folder. Within that folder would be a verdict form designed to 
include any remaining questions that might be helpful for later 
proceedings. For example, it could include questions about 
impermissible reasoning, such as bias; the grounds for the conviction, 
such as theories of liability; and matters unrelated to guilt, such as 
criminal forfeiture and sentencing. The completion of that verdict form 
would end the deliberation process. 
This verdict system would do much to address the problems of 
general verdicts.58 By guiding jurors through the points necessary for a 
 
 57 As noted above, the Supreme Court has suggested that special findings verdicts 
could be appropriate “where risk of prejudice to the defendant is slight and the 
advantage of securing particularized fact-finding is substantial.” Black v. United States, 
561 U.S. 465, 472 n.11 (2010) (citation omitted); see supra note 22. Any verdict system 
designed to reduce bias and flawed convictions that avoids harming defendants would 
seem to satisfy that test. 
 58 See supra Part II. 
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conviction before they could finalize a guilty verdict, the questions on 
the second verdict form would help to prevent convictions infected by 
shortcuts, biases, or confusion. Additionally, those questions, along 
with the questions on the third verdict form, would serve to reveal 
impermissible reasoning for later review and tie that review to the jury’s 
actual findings. 
The procedure would also honor prevailing judicial concerns and 
practice. First of all, it would ensure that jurors are never pressured to 
convict by the interrogatories — even informally by viewing them 
before reaching a verdict59 — because, to review them, they must 
adjudge the defendant guilty and unanimously attest to that fact. In 
other words, defendants could not be harmed by the questions because, 
at most, they would cause the jury to reconsider a finding of guilt. 
Additionally, jurors would retain full independence to acquit, and to do 
so without giving reasons,60 because they would never reach the 
interrogatories if they acquitted initially and the second verdict form 
would be shredded if they acquitted after completing it. Moreover, the 
procedure would eliminate concerns that interrogatories could harm 
defendants by confusing the jury because jurors could only access them 
after voting to convict. Thus, any confusion would either not affect the 
outcome or benefit the defendant. Furthermore, jurors could not be 
encouraged to maintain a conviction or be confused into doing so by 
the non-elements questions (on the third verdict form) because those 
questions could not be considered unless the verdict was irreversibly 
decided.61 Lastly, because juries would always return general verdicts, 
and the special interrogatories would always be answered after the jury 
had decided to convict, this procedure fits neatly within the existing 
framework for non-general verdicts.62 
 
 59 See Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 271 (explaining that “it is better practice to submit the 
general verdict and special verdict forms separately,” rather than together, to prevent 
jurors from “look[ing] down the page at the special findings before rendering a guilty 
verdict” (citations omitted)); Spock, 416 F.2d at 183 (concluding that jurors might be 
swayed by interrogatories even if they were instructed only to answer them “if a general 
verdict of guilty had been reached”). 
 60 See United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998) (“To ask the jury 
special questions might be said to infringe . . . on its power to arrive at a general verdict 
without having to support it by reasons or by a report of its deliberations.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 61 Cf. Hedgepeth, 434 F.3d at 613-14 (indicating that even sentencing interrogatories 
would need to be submitted “to the jury after a guilty verdict has been returned” to 
avoid conviction pressure (citation omitted)).  
 62 See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, there are counterarguments. First, some might find my 
approach cumbersome. However, it is not much more cumbersome 
than what jurors are presently called upon to do, i.e., decide whether 
the elements of a crime have been proved and potentially answer 
interrogatories, and it is certainly not as extreme as some possible 
approaches, such as bifurcating proceedings or requiring jury opinions 
drafted by a court officer.63 Additionally, reducing bias or like 
deficiencies in convictions is worth more procedures and could avert 
lengthy review proceedings. Second, prosecutors might believe my 
approach tilts the scales in defendants’ favor. But prosecutors already 
possess a slew of advantages;64 judicial concerns regarding non-general 
verdicts reflect a desire to protect defendants, not prosecutors;65 and 
given that “[t]he role of a prosecutor is to see that justice is done,”66 
prosecutors should welcome methods of ensuring the validity of 
convictions. Third, some may note that “empirical data on the effects of 
special versus general verdicts are limited, and the results are mixed.”67 
That criticism is fair, and full testing of my proposal would certainly be 
beneficial. However, it is hard to imagine how my proposal could make 
things worse. It simply requires juries to explicitly answer questions 
that they are generally already tasked with resolving, and it would, at 
minimum, improve the process by enabling meaningful review. 
CONCLUSION 
Juries can be biased and logically imperfect. And unfortunately, our 
verdict system facilitates those shortcomings. We must, therefore, do 
more. 
One solution is to use special findings verdicts in every case, which 
could reduce shortcut thinking, reduce complexity and confusion, and 
permit judicial review. Although courts are reluctant to adopt such a 
solution, judicial concerns can be navigated without succumbing to the 
problems of general verdicts. And the verdict system proposed here, 
which would require interrogatories only when the jury is proceeding 
towards a conviction, would do just that. 
 
 63 See Hedgepeth, 434 F.3d at 613 n.2; Curci, supra note 5, at 240. 
 64 See, e.g., Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 39, 87 (2014). 
 65 See supra Part I. 
 66 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011). 
 67 Kayla A. Burd & Valerie P. Hans, Reasoned Verdicts: Oversold?, 51 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 319, 345 (2018); accord Nepveu, supra note 33, at 265. 
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Of course, this solution is not a cure-all to bias in the courtroom or 
the criminal justice system. That insidious problem will require much 
more work. But every protection counts. Rethinking verdicts could do 
much to improve our jury system and help ensure that the jury truly 
serves as the “criminal defendant’s fundamental ‘protection of life and 
liberty against race or color prejudice.’”68  
 
 68 Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (citation omitted). 
